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VICTORY WITHOUT DOCTRINE

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## Abstract of

### VICTORY WITHOUT DOCTRINE

The challenge for leaders, planners, and warriors is to apply doctrine to maximize the effectiveness of the nation's military power. This study of Operation Allied Force, the air operations in Serbia, shows the results of poorly applying the doctrine we have developed over many years of experience and study. During the planning for Kosovo the Joint crisis action planning process was not followed. Ignoring the process deprived senior leadership of the benefit of a thorough analysis, limited the planners' ability to plan and understand the objectives, and resulted in our forces being ill-prepared for the ensuing operations.

Joint and Service doctrine emphasize the importance of the principles of war and they are incorporated into the joint planning process as a guide and analysis tool. The only principle of war fully applied in during Operation Allied Force was the principle of security. Allied Force was offensive in nature but failed to seize, retain and fully exploit the initiative. Similarly, lots of mass was used but, did not equate to a decisive employment of combat power. The other six principles of war (objective, maneuver, simplicity, unity of command, surprise, and economy of force) were fully violated.

The result was a costly NATO battle victory but, forces are still engaged in a hostile environment. The cost was high for both sides, a high cost that could have been reduced by proper planning and a good application of the principles of war. Allied Force did not show us that any of our doctrine needs changing only that failing to following it raises the price and requires overwhelming force that might not be available in the next operation.

## **Victory Without Doctrine**

Planning for air operations in Kosovo started in March 1998, a full year prior to execution. The initial tasking came verbally from Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR) to the Commander of US Air Forces Europe (USAFE). The operations and intelligence planners came primarily from the 32<sup>nd</sup> Air Operations Group, attached to the USAFE Staff. As the commander of the 32<sup>nd</sup> Air Operations Squadron, I was intimately involved in the planning and execution process from the first phone call until the last bomb was dropped. My involvement provided an in-depth perspective of how poorly European Command followed Joint planning processes, how CINCEUR's guidance prevented air operations from following Joint and Air Force doctrine, and the impact this had on the conduct of Operation Allied Force.

The question this paper explores is, "How did NATO achieve a military victory that forced the Serbian government to withdraw forces from Kosovo and allow an international military force to occupy their hallowed territory when Joint and Air Force doctrine were so poorly employed?" US-dominated NATO forces achieved a military victory in spite of ignoring most of the deliberate and crisis planning procedures and violating almost all of the principles of war. I will show where planning and execution of Allied Force did and did not follow doctrine, how that impacted the conflict, and how this could impact doctrine and future operations.

### **The Planning Process**

Hundreds of years of animosity between Orthodox Serbians and ethnic Albanian Moslems had evolved into a guerilla style separatist movement in the province of Kosovo. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was attacking Serbian police, military,

and civilians in an insurgency to gain independence from Serbia. In 1998 the population in Kosovo was approximately 90% Albanian but Serbians controlled the regional government and police force. Kosovo is also the location of a historical battlefield of great significance for Serbian people. The battle fought there helped define Serbia as a people and nation. The result is that Serbia is not willing to allow Kosovo to secede. The differences between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbian nationalists appear to be irreconcilable and form the basis for many years of bloody conflict. By 1998 many civilians were fleeing the conflict and creating a humanitarian crisis in NATO's backyard.

CINCEUR's initial tasking was to develop a plan for a very limited, signal sending, single strike/raid against a few communications nodes that would degrade Serbian President Slobodan Milosovic's ability to command and control his forces in Kosovo. The hope was that sending a forceful signal would cause the Serbians to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the KLA<sup>1</sup>. This strategy of hope prevailed throughout the operation. CINCEUR directed a target based planning process, without an identified end state that was based on a coercive strategy of hope that Serbia would comply with NATO demands after just a few days of bombing<sup>2</sup>. The planning and execution mostly ignored both Joint and Air Force doctrine by not following established planning processes and ignoring the value of effects based strategic attack. European Command could have easily followed the crisis action planning process defined in Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Doctrine. In that document, the phases of the crisis action planning process are controlled by series of messages starting with the CINC's assessment and ending with an execute order (see figure below).

## SUMMARY OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCESS<sup>3</sup>

Phase I Situation Development	Phase II Crisis Assessment	Phase III Course of Action Development	Phase IV Course of Action Selection	Phase V Execution Planning	Phase VI Execution
<b>EVENT</b>					
Event occurs with possible national security implications	CINC's report/assessment received	CJCS sends Warning Order	CJCS presents refined and prioritized COA's to NCA	CINC receives Alert Order or Planning Order	NCA decide to execute OPORD
<b>ACTION</b>					
Monitor world situation  Recognize problem  Submit CINC's assessment	Increase awareness  Increase reporting JS assess situation JS advise on possible military action  NCA-CJCS evaluation	Develop COA's CINC assigns tasks to subordinates by evaluation request message  Create/modify TPFDD  USTRANSCOM prepares deployment estimates  Evaluate COA's	CJCS advice to NCA  CJCS may send planning order to begin execution planning before selection of COA by NCA	CINC develops OPORD  Refine TPFDD  Force preparation	CJCS sends Execute Order by authority of SECDEF  CNC executes OPORD  JPEC reports execution status  Begin redeployment planning
<b>OUTCOME</b>					
Assess that event may have national implications  Report event to NCA/JCS	NCA/CJCS decide to develop military COA	CINC sends commander's estimate with recommended COA	NCA select COA CJCS releases NCA COA selection in Alert Order	CINC sends OPORD	Crisis resolved  Redeployment of forces

Notes: 1. CAP phases are scenario dependent since actual planning time can vary from hours to months. Therefore, phases may be conducted sequentially concurrently, compressed, or eliminated altogether.

2. The NCA, in coordination with the CJCS, may elect to return to situation monitoring at any point during CAP.

Most Allied Force air operations planning stayed at the PowerPoint briefing stage and rarely progressed to an official, coordinated, signed document. Multiple versions of the briefings were distributed through the SIPRNET with no process for determining authenticity, currency, or whether they had even been approved. Additionally, very little

guidance came in official documents, most of it was verbally issued guidance during briefings and video teleconferences (VTCs). Some of the significant benefits of the Joint Pub 5-0 planning process, and the orders that define each phase, are the establishment of DoD wide planning priorities and command relationships. At USAFE, even after being designated as Joint Task Force (JTF) Sky Anvil, we had severe difficulty getting support from outside intelligence organizations, the Joint Staff, and other major commands because there was no Warning or Planning Orders to establish these priorities and relationships. The CINC's assessment and the Warning Order also establish the clear objectives needed to focus the planning effort. Without these objectives the planners are forced to interpret numerous public announcements, varying verbal guidance, and just make their best guess on the end state, command structure, desired effects, duration, force structure, and appropriate target sets. Even though the planning process was in a crisis action mode since March 1998 the first US message traffic was the Alert and Pre-deployment order that was not issued until early 1999. The only Operations Plan developed was NATO's OPLAN 10601. It was based on a late 1998 version of a sequentially phased air operation that ignored the airpowers ability for parallel operations<sup>4</sup>. OPLAN 10601 was never updated and an operational order was never written or approved.

The planners at USAFE developed four different plans based on the CINC's guidance and initiated development of one on our own. The first one was the communications node raid mentioned above. The second plan, called Nimble Lion, was the basis of NATO OPLAN 10601. The third plan was a limited air response (LAR), a limited target set, that could be initiated based on some ill-defined Serbian aggression.

The fourth plan was a scaled down version of the OPLAN 10601 phased air operation (PAO) called PAO-minus with a smaller set of forces and yet another set of targets. The plan we initiated was a final attempt to convince the CINC that a doctrinally based campaign was needed, we called it Allied Talon. The briefing was formatted as a briefing the CINC could present to convince NATO and US leadership to take a campaign approach, not the two-days only, maybe a third day if the weather is bad, option that was being forced on us. All the plans were generally well received by the CINC but he could not convince NATO and US leadership to support a larger plan.

The disadvantages of ignoring the crisis action planning process contributed to the CINC's inability to convince others that planning for a long term, campaign approach was required. The planning process would have required the development of alternative courses of action that are compared, contrasted, and fully evaluated. Each alternative is assessed against our objectives, advantages and disadvantages are listed, the risks of each alternative are reviewed, and each is measured against the possible enemy courses of action. This process gives both the CINC, the NCA, and all alliance members the information necessary to make an informed decision.

Planning was also complicated by a convoluted organizational structure. EUCOM initially established two separate Service-based Joint Task Forces (JTFs) in 1998. JTF SKY ANVIL (JTF-SA) was an US Air Force dominated, invention designated an US-only, planning-only, JTF for the development of NATO airpower options against Serbia. The "planning-only" aspect was necessary because there was an established NATO Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) and air operations center that would execute air operations. The US-only aspect was driven by the need to



maintain security of US stealth and cruise missile assets and to preserve operational security. During execution NATO's Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), would control the air war except for US cruise missile and stealth assets. The 32nd AOG formed the core of JTF-SA.

The US Navy based JTF Flexible Anvil (JTF-FA), organized around Sixth Fleet headquarters was established around the same time and they were responsible for the execution of US-Only cruise missile and stealth assets. Sixth Fleet could provide the command and control needed to execute the US-only assets outside of NATO channels. We had two separate US-only JTFs dealing with the same assets, within an area of operations owned by a NATO command structure. This is a clear violation of the unity of command principle. Lieutenant General Michael Short, 16<sup>th</sup> Air Force Commander, NATO's Air South Commander and the designated NATO CFACC for Bosnia commanded JTF-SA. Vice Admiral Daniel Murphy, the Sixth Fleet Commander, commanded JTF-FA. Although there was an outstanding working relationship between the two commanders, the co-equal US JTF chains of command unnecessarily complicated the NATO planning effort and command and control. Fortunately, the two JTFs were disbanded after the Rambouillet agreements and did not have to execute any operations.

The end result was a non-doctrinal planning approach that produced three potential air operations (the PAO, the LAR and the PAO-minus), one outdated OPLAN, no OPORD, and only approval for a two-day, maybe three if the weather is bad, show of force with a hope-based strategy, and no plan on what to do after the 48<sup>th</sup> hour of operations. Following the Joint crisis action planning process would have greatly improved our ability to plan and the results of the planning effort. We still might have

ended up with approval for just the first 48 hours but at least there would have been some analysis behind it and an easy transition. Now lets look at how well Allied Force followed the principles of war.

## **Principles of War**

One of the guides used when reviewing course of action (COA) alternatives is to compare how well the COA follows the principles of war. The course of action eventually pursued during Allied Force violated and ignored most of the principles of war and Air Force doctrine.

Joint Pub 3-0 and Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (AFDD 1) state that the principles of war guide warfighting at all levels and are the enduring bedrock of US doctrine<sup>5</sup>. AFDD 1 goes on to state that the complexity of war prohibits using the principles as a checklist for victory but, they are a valuable guide to evaluate courses of action<sup>6</sup>. Using the principles of war is also a valuable guide for exploring past operations for the purpose of learning lessons that might helpful in the future. The following table lists the principles of war and a short definition as a reference for the following analysis.

### **PRINCIPLES OF WAR<sup>7</sup>**

Objective	Every military operation should be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective.
Offensive	Act rather than react and dictate the time, place, purpose, scope, intensity, and pace of operations. The initiative must be seized, retained, and fully exploited.
Mass	Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive time and place.
Economy of Force	Create usable mass by using minimum combat power on secondary objectives. Make the fullest use of all forces available.
Maneuver	Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
Unity of Command	Ensure unity of effort for every objective under one responsible commander.
Security	Protect friendly forces and their operations from enemy actions which could provide the enemy with unexpected advantage.
Surprise	Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.
Simplicity	Avoid unnecessary complexity in preparing, planning, and conducting military operations.

Objective. Joe Lockhart, White House spokesman, said the objective of the bombing campaign was to “stop the killing and achieve a durable peace” in the area. He speculated that NATO had to address the problem because a failure to act would have destroyed its credibility. He also assumed that not acting would only mean “someone would have to step in later at a greater cost in lives and money”.<sup>8</sup>

President Clinton articulated three objectives during a press conference announcing the start of Operation Allied Force. He was also concerned that “the risk was too great that the conflict will involve and destabilize neighboring nations<sup>9</sup>.” The President’s objectives were:

1. To demonstrate NATO’s opposition to aggression and its support for peace
2. To impose a price on Milosovic if he continues or escalates attacks on helpless civilians
3. To diminish his military ability to wage war in Kosovo in the future

One military objective was articulated by Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon: “The military goal of air strikes would be to diminish or degrade the ability of the Serb forces from attacking the Kosovar Albanians”<sup>10</sup>.

The Pentagon’s after action report listed five “well coordinated at the political and military levels” NATO objectives<sup>11</sup> (a mix of tactical, operational and strategic objectives):

1. Enable unhindered NATO air operations
2. Isolate Serb military and security forces in Kosovo
3. Degrade combat capability of Serb military and security forces in Kosovo
4. Compel Yugoslav leaders to withdraw their forces from Kosovo and cease hostilities
5. Reduce Yugoslavia capability to conduct and sustain offensive operations.

Although the three Presidential objectives stated at the beginning of the war appear to be clearly defined they did not translate easily to militarily obtainable

objectives that lead to a classic victory, and the all important description of an end state is noticeably absent<sup>12</sup>. The after action report does a better job of defining the end state with all Serbian forces withdrawn from Kosovo but stops short of defining a final resolution of the centuries old conflict. The first objective, to demonstrate opposition to aggression and support for peace, is easily accomplished by dropping a few bombs or firing a few missiles. However, compliance with NATO demands/victory is left for Milosovic to decide. This was publicly stated by Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon and NATO Spokesman Jamie Shay.<sup>13</sup> The second objective calls for classic coercion to convince the Serbian leadership to change their behavior. The method for accomplishing this can take many forms utilizing all the instruments of national power. When coercing a belligerent and not occupying their territory, the decision to comply always rests with the belligerent. The leader under attack can simply try to ride out the attacks and wait for the attacker to lose patience as the North Vietnamese did to the US. They can also change their behavior quickly. General Short, the CFACC, continually argued for quick, decisive, strategic attacks to apply a lot of pressure.<sup>14</sup> General Short and his planners knew that if the Serbians chose to stay dispersed and concealed, airpower would have limited effectiveness against ground forces. General Clark favored a gradualistic approach that included a heavy dose of interdiction to apply this pressure and raise the cost of war to Yugoslavia. The Serbians considered their conflict to be a counterinsurgency war over hallowed ground, a nationalistic issue, and it appeared nothing short of complete ethnic cleansing would satisfy them.

A good case can be made that the gradual approach to Allied Force unnecessarily prolonged the conflict and drove up the cost to both Serbia, in the form of destruction to

their country, and to NATO in the form of spent national treasure. A more aggressive operation based on a well considered strategy could have significantly shortened the conflict, and possibly reduced the damage, but there is little doubt that it would have prolonged the operation past 78 days.

The objective, “to impose a price” and “isolate Serb military” translated into interdicting the flow of supplies and men to the south, was also poorly defined and generally unattainable. In limited cases, when ground forces are heavily engaged and consuming lots of logistics, an aggressive interdiction campaign would have a big impact on the flow of supplies and enemy operations. However, the Serbians controlled the ethnic cleansing pace and did not require huge supplies. Additionally, the mountainous terrain, the developed infrastructure and numerous alternatives made it impossible to completely stop the flow and have more than a minimal impact. Therefore, the objective was disconnected from the conflict occurring in Kosovo, making it unattainable.

Military objectives and campaign plans must be closely tied to the enemy’s political objectives to achieve victory.<sup>15</sup> Destroying a lot of bridges, supply depots, and military industry, all easy to identify targets, had very little impact on Serbian operations in Kosovo.

President Milosovic eventually agreed to come to the bargaining table but the victory was not quick or decisive since the Serbians were able to withdraw with their forces intact. This left the “diminish his military” and “reduce Yugoslavia capability” objective unachieved. This also ties to Unity of Command. With a committee approach to target approval, no guiding campaign plan, and no significant ground action, it was impossible to maximize the effectiveness of interdiction.

Offensive. Operation Allied Force could be defined as a “strategic offensive” and offensive is one of only two principles of war that were loosely followed. Allied Force was a reaction to Serbian aggression but NATO definitely controlled the time, place, purpose, scope, intensity, and pace of air operations. However, this principle is also defined as seizing, retaining and fully exploiting the initiative. With fuzzy objectives, in a limited war scenario designed to coerce a national leader, it is hard to define when you have the initiative let alone exploit it. Numerous spokespersons emphasized that it was up to President Milosovic to decide when the bombing would stop. This is an unequivocal sign that Serbia had control of the diplomatic initiative and by their actions could control the effectiveness of NATO air operations. The CFACC, his planners, and other senior US leaders firmly believed that using airpower alone gave little guarantee of success because only President Milosovic could decide when Serbia had suffered enough. So, even though Allied Force maintained an offensive posture, the holder of the initiative was continually questioned.

Mass. The key word in the principle of mass definition is “decisive.” At the scientific level, the 6728 precision and 16587 non-precision weapons used during Allied Force equals a tremendous amount of mass and destructive power.<sup>16</sup> But employed against target sets, in a piece-meal fashion, over 2 ½ months, and primarily against small groups of fielded forces, does not equate to a decisive employment of combat power. The principle of mass ties back to a clearly defined objective.

One of the primary political concerns driving the operation’s lack of intensity and targets, was preserving NATO’s unity. Prolonging the war can have the same effect on unity and fortunately for NATO, Serbia decided to comply with demands. This concern

prevented the military planners from concentrating power in a more decisive manner based on the Air Force's current doctrine that emphasizes strategic attack and parallel operations<sup>17</sup>. Although a tremendous effort was expended, it was not concentrated at a decisive time and place. The Operation Allied Force battle is over but the quest for resolution of conflict in Kosovo continues. The intense fighting in Kosovo has subsided but the animosities in that region go back hundreds of years and NATO forces are still there trying to keep a fragile peace.

Economy of Force. Allied Force's 78-day combined bombing campaign did not apply the economy of force principle. Because of the lack of approved targets CAOC planners were forced to continue re-attacking large facilities, like petroleum refineries. Petroleum refineries are relatively easy to disable with a few precision bombs aimed at the distribution pumps and the distilling/cracking towers.<sup>18</sup> This prevents refining new products and distributing the refined products to tankers truck, barges, etc. During Allied Force the JTF directed the JFACC to attack each refinery dozens of times in an attempt to destroy each and every storage tank. Many storage tanks were destroyed with expensive precision guided weapons. Later in the conflict B-52s and B-1s dropped huge bomb loads on already severely damaged refineries. We started calling this new JTF directed tactic "precision rubblization". One of the CINC's objectives was to create a fire ball each night that the populations of nearby cities could see so they knew a war was being fought<sup>19</sup>. Exploding petroleum maximized the "CNN effect". In order to enhance economy of force, Air Force doctrine has been evolved toward effects-based precision bombing focused on destroying the function of a target with the least amount of effort, without turning the target into rubble. Once the target is disabled then further attacks are

not required until the targets function is restored. By wasting dozens of missions on disabled refineries the Kosovo campaign violated "economy of force" resulting in a prolonged and more destructive campaign.

Another example of how the principle of economy of force was not applied was in the use of stealth aircraft. There were numerous, high value, strategic targets that required the special capabilities of F-117s and B-2s. The advantage of using the capabilities of these aircraft early in the conflict to maximize the impact of the operation was not realized because many of the targets were never approved. Although very effective against the targets they attacked, the fullest use of the available forces was not achieved.

Maneuver. Maneuver is the second principle Allied Force attempted to follow. Maneuver places the enemy in a disadvantageous position by applying flexible combat power.<sup>20</sup> To airmen it "allows engagement almost anywhere, from almost any direction, thus forcing the adversary to be on the guard everywhere."<sup>21</sup> Airpower by its very nature exploits maneuver with inherent speed, range and flexibility. But maneuver alone will not achieve victory. Maneuver must be employed with mass, economy of force, and it enhances our ability to achieve surprise. The approaches to Serbia were restricted for political reasons and friendly force basing. Serbian forces quickly figured out the standard approach corridors and adjusted their defenses and increased the danger to NATO forces. In May, when we started basing additional forces in Hungary and Turkey, the approach options greatly increased and improved maneuver. However, the failure to effectively employ mass and economy of force negated the positive effects of maneuver.



Unity of Command. Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, states that “Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency.”<sup>22</sup>

The target approval process lacked unity of effort and effectively gave separate command authority to each nation conducting or hosting the attacking assets. Even after the proposed target had successfully navigated a Byzantine target approval process, the CINC, the nation conducting the mission, or the nation the mission launched from could withdraw target approval. On several occasions missions were cancelled well after they had launched. This process greatly restricted unity of effort and negatively impacted efficiency and effectiveness. This helped extend the campaign and it is arguable that the gradualistic approach contributed to the lack of shock and the Serbian perception that they could outlast NATO resolve. The impact of destroying a particular target set was severely reduced when the targets in that set were approved in a piecemeal fashion.

To further complicate Allied Force, there was a dual US and NATO chain of command. Fortunately the separate command structures were led by US commanders that were dual hatted as NATO commanders. Unfortunately, each chain of command had a different staff and different procedures for issuing orders and collecting information. To go along with this dual chain of command the Joint Staff insisted on keeping information on US stealth aircraft and cruise missile missions in US-only channels.<sup>23</sup>

This requirement forced the CAOC to produce two separate Air Tasking Orders, increasing the probability of fratricide and making command and control much more difficult than it had to be. After numerous attempts the air tasking orders were finally consolidated in May 99. But, the air tasking order was incomplete and specific target and routing information was transmitted separately.

At the operational level there were multiple agencies conducting battle damage assessment with a confused net result on target status. Battle damage assessment was conducted at the US-Only JTF Noble Anvil, at the multinational CAOC, at the Joint Analysis Center in England and at USAFE headquarters in Germany. Each agency was being supported by numerous other intelligence organizations. As a planner it became almost impossible to find two sources that agreed on a target's status. The end result was that we wasted missions on already severely damaged or destroyed targets.

The lack of unity made it very difficult to focus on any operationally driven objective other than the destruction of the Serbian ground force targets in Kosovo. This was the one target set the CINC was allowed to approve on his own authority. Unfortunately the effectiveness of these attacks were extremely limited because the Serbians were not engaged in intense land combat, making them very hard to locate.

Security. Security was the only principle of war that Allied Force strictly followed. Throughout the planning process the CINC emphasized the need to prevent friendly losses. Extensive measures were taken to protect NATO forces from Serbian aerial, land, and naval attack.

Some critics have argued that security measures also degraded the effectiveness of attacks by driving NATO forces to higher altitudes. The use of precision guided munitions eliminated many of the disadvantages that higher operating altitudes have on unguided weapons. The only impact was the greater difficulty in locating fielded Serbian forces in Kosovo but the impact was minimal because of the low intensity of Serbian operations. Only two aircraft and no aircrew losses confirm the effectiveness of security

measures. Security of forces is rarely a war winning principle however, if ignored it could definitely be a war losing principle.

Surprise. A slow, methodical, gradual increase in pressure does not lend itself to surprise and its associated shock. During Allied Force the air campaign was graduated in intensity, geographically, by target category, and by the targets "CNN effect" potential (defined by potential for collateral damage and unintended civilian casualty estimate). Different NATO nations had different interests and reasons to disapprove different targets and the end result was a three dimensional micro-gradualism. Initial target approval was restricted by the estimated civilian casualty estimate, a very unscientifically derived number. The initial fixed target approvals were restricted to targets with less than 20-25 estimated civilian casualties. Later in the operation, targets with 200-300 estimated civilian casualties were attacked but, only in certain cities (such as Pristina), and never Belgrade. During most of the operation, the CINC reviewed each approved target in the air tasking order at the morning VTC, and on occasion (depending on his assessment of risk and mood (NATO leadership, the media, etc)) he would again approve or disapprove each target. Even though Allied Force was an offensive operation in nature, the gradual approach gave the enemy adequate time to adjust, repair, and continue ethnic cleansing operations.

Allied Force lost operational level surprise before the first mission due to extensive diplomatic efforts and numerous threats. As a result of the threats and deployments in the Fall of 1998 the Serbians had a good model to base their assessment of threat from NATO. With plenty of warning the Serbian military forces had time to

disperse from their garrisons, deploy and conceal forces thus becoming very difficult to locate.

Simplicity. The Allied Force campaign was loaded with complexity. The target approval process was slow and inconsistent, the CINC's focus changed between strategic attack, interdiction, and fielded forces, and there were numerous, changing restrictions on where, when, and how bombing missions could be conducted. The US-only stealth and cruise missile targets needed National Command Authority approval. Elaborate PowerPoint slides, that worked their way through the JTF commander, the CINC, the Joint Staff and the Chairman, were required for NCA approval. One of the requirements on the slide was the platform and weapons that would be used against the target. Many of these slides were produced months before the operation, during an all-night VTC effort that included all theater 4-stars, and this greatly restricted the planners. The targets were susceptible to numerous platform/weapons combinations that were not included on the slides.

Additional complexity grew from the need to integrate and deconflict F-117 with the non-stealth attacks. Due to the F-117s characteristics, they were not easily integrated with other NATO missions and had to be deconflicted by time and space. At the beginning of the war, similar to the Route Packs in Vietnam, only stealth and cruise missiles could attack north of Kosovo. As we degraded Serbian air defense the aluminum jets were cleared to the north and the stealth was restricted from the south except on several occasions. The end result was a complex campaign that made it difficult to obtain our objectives.

From the analysis of the principles of war we can understand why there is so much criticism of the operation for its lack of effectiveness and the extent of damage that was eventually necessary to coerce Serbian leadership. Offensive and maneuver are inherent qualities that airpower can provide but were not effectively used during Allied Force. Security was the only principle of war that was closely followed. Even with this obvious lack of adherence to the principles of war NATO forces were able to achieve what has been described as a victory. This was accomplished through the use of overwhelming technological and numerical advantages and the resolve and unity that was questioned by many.

## **Conclusion**

Allied Force planning was much more difficult than it had to be. The techniques and procedures for crisis action planning are well documented in Joint and Service publications and are taught extensively at both Joint and Service schools. The staffs at USAFE and EUCOM are products of that education system and were prepared to follow the process but the well established approach to planning was ignored and we unnecessarily suffered for that decision. By ignoring the process both US and NATO leaders were deprived of the analysis and associated understanding that a thorough review provides. The planning process provides detailed analysis that leads to a better understanding of the situation and a better understanding leads to better solutions. The crisis action planning process is flexible and should be used faithfully for each operation and the results will benefit from it.

Both Joint and Air Force doctrine emphasize the importance of the principles of war. The review of how poorly Allied Force followed these principles illustrates a

scenario where you can substitute overwhelming superiority for a bad application of the principles of war. However, even with overwhelming superiority, ignoring the principles of war can prolong the conflict and greatly increase the costs to both sides. As long as mega-powers like NATO can afford the inefficiency and ineffectiveness caused by ignoring the principles of war then we don't need to study, practice, or refine our doctrine. Operation Allied Force provided a good example of the impact of not following doctrine rather than providing an example that shows how doctrine needs to evolve. That is why we should use the time honored principles of war to help guide every operation, so we are prepared for the ones where we don't have the luxury of overwhelming power.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> John P. Jumper, General, "Statement," U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Kosovo Effect on Readiness, Hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, sub-committee on Readiness, 28 October 1999.
- <sup>2</sup> Dana Priest, "The Commander's War: Bombing by Committee." The Washington Post, 20 September 1999, 1. <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Sep1999/e19990920bombing.htm>>.
- <sup>3</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Joint Pub 5-0) (Washington, D.C.: April 13, 1995), III-11.
- <sup>4</sup> Deptula, David A., "Firing for Effect: Change in the Nature of Warfare," Aerospace Education Foundation, (Arlington, Virginia: 24 August 1995), 1-9.
- <sup>5</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-0) (Washington, D.C.: February 1, 1995), A-1; Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Force Basic Doctrine, (Air Force Doctrine Document 1) (Washington, D.C.: September 1997), 11.
- <sup>6</sup> Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Force Basic Doctrine, (Air Force Doctrine Document 1) (Washington, D.C.: September 1997), 12.
- <sup>7</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-0) (Washington, D.C.: February 1, 1995), Appendix A; Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Force Basic Doctrine, (Air Force Doctrine Document 1) (Washington, D.C.: September 1997), Chap 2.
- <sup>8</sup> Garamone, Jim and Linda D. Kozaryn, "NATO Attacks Serbs to Prevent Killings," Armed Forces Press Service, 24 March 1999, <<http://www.usafe.af.mil/kosovo/afps-03.htm>> (14 April 2000).
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>10</sup> Kozaryne, Linda D., "NATO Air Strikes Imminent," American Forces Press Service, 24 March 1999, <[www.usafe.af.mil/kosovo/afps-02.htm](http://www.usafe.af.mil/kosovo/afps-02.htm)> (14 April 2000).
- <sup>11</sup> Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, (Washington, D.C.: 31 January 2000), 24.
- <sup>12</sup> Although these objectives were not publicly announced until the eve of Operation Allied Force they were part of the unclear guidance provided to the planners. Joint Pub 3-0 states that defining the end state is a critical first step in the estimate and planning process.
- <sup>13</sup> Garamone, Jim, "Allied Force Bombing Campaign Continues", American Forces Press Service, 26 March 1999, <<http://www.usafe.af.mil/kosovo/afps-04.htm>> (24 April 2000).

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<sup>14</sup> Michael C. Short, Lieutenant General, USAF, Combined Forces Air Component Commander, interviewed by Lt Col Paul Strickland, 16 June 1999, author has copy of transcript from tape recording.

<sup>15</sup> Warden, John A. III, The Air Campaign, Planning for Combat, (Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1988), 132.

<sup>16</sup> Air War Over Serbia Fact Sheet, 31 Jan 00, <<http://www.afssa.hq.af.mil/.htm>>

<sup>17</sup> Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Force Basic Doctrine, (Air Force Doctrine Document 1) (Washington, D.C.: September 1997), 24, 32, 37, 51-53. Air Force Chief of Staff, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power (Air Force Doctrine Document 2) (Washington, D.C.: 17 February 2000), I, 7-8, 53, 55, 56, <[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service\\_pubs/afd2.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afd2.pdf)>

<sup>18</sup> Wuesthoff, Scott E., The Utility of Targeting the Petroleum-Based Sector of a Nation's Economic Infrastructure, (masters thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), (Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, June 1994), 24-27.

<sup>19</sup> This guidance was given verbally during one of the daily VTC's. It was also evident from the JTF's guidance to continue to attack severely damaged targets that were no longer functional.

<sup>20</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-0) (Washington, D.C.: February 1, 1995), A-2.

<sup>21</sup> Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Force Basic Doctrine, (Air Force Doctrine Document 1) (Washington, D.C.: September 1997), 17.

<sup>22</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, (Joint Pub 3-56.1) (Washington, D.C.: 14 November 1994), v.

<sup>23</sup> During planning for the operation the dual-ATO process was debated at length. We made numerous attempts to get a waiver for US classification requirements. The only way to comply with the restrictions was to build two separate ATOs. These classifications restrictions are for 2<sup>nd</sup> (F-117) and 3<sup>rd</sup> (B-2) generation stealth technology employed in very limited numbers. What are we going to do when we start employing hundreds of 4<sup>th</sup> generation stealth F-22s in high-tempo combined operations? We can't leave the F-22 off the ATO and expect to effectively and efficiently use congested airspace.